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The state of the art of the debate between externalist and internalist concepts of language is 
reviewed in this paper, and a new conceptualization of language as a “developmental hybrid” is 
suggested that entails that it equally comprises environmental and organism-internal component 
pieces, in an ultimately non dissociable way. The key for understanding this hybrid status is to 
be found in development, for when individually evolving, a general dynamic is observed in which 
organism-internal facilities selectively apply to certain designated aspects of the environmental 
stimulus, which in their turn have a facilitatory impact on these very same facilities. These kinds 
of loops inspire the conclusion that the internal and the external compose a single, integrated 
developmental unit. 
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My own suspicion is that a central part of what we call “learning” is actually better 
understood as the growth of cognitive structures along an internally directed course 
under the triggering and partially shaping effect of the environment.
Noam Chomsky (1980: 3)
1 Introduction
The emergence and consolidation of the field of Evolutionary Linguistics in the last few 
decades, has brought to the fore with a new impetus the question that mostly worried 
Ferdinand de Saussure when he took the first steps into the discipline of Linguistics as we 
know it today: What kind of object language is that it deserves a scientifically specialized 
attention? The situation is aptly captured by Bolhuis et al. (2014: 1), who claim that there 
is a general “lack of clarity regarding the language phenotype,” which inevitably leads to 
a corresponding “lack of clarity regarding its evolutionary origins.” The picture gets even 
more complicated if one takes into account, for example, Ray Jackendoff’s contention 
that even among those who share a similar ontological commitment about language—e.g. 
those who share “the contemporary view of language, which goes beneath the cultural 
differences among languages” (Jackendoff 2010: 63), a basic mutual understanding is 
made difficult by the volatility of each researcher’s theoretical biases (see, for a similar 
statement, Tallerman & Gibson 2012: 15–26). A first rough approximation to this onto-
logical issue may be made based on the recognition of two main axes of disagreement.
On the one hand, opposing the view that Jackendoff refers to as “the contemporary view 
of language,” for many the socio-cultural dimension of language must still be  privileged. 
According to this view, languages are just external, socially shared codes of sorts, which 
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somehow get accommodated within an a priori uncompromised neural substrate in the 
early experience of children. Clearly enough, the way brains are organized and learn are 
taken as obvious determinants of the structure of languages themselves. But the position 
relies on the premise that there are not naturally a priori expectations concerning how 
languages are or the extent to which they can vary, beyond that general, language-neutral 
ones. The reigning Vygotskyan and Piagetian psychological traditions of the first half 
of the 20th Century can be taken as paradigmatic specimens of this position. For Lev 
Vygotsky, for example, language belonged to cultural development, a layer of human 
development different from and dependent on ontogeny proper, which brings about the 
underlying “natural functions” for the former to take place (Vygostky 1986). Similarly, 
Jean Piaget signaled the “formal operational stage” as the upper limit of cognitive devel-
opment proper, and he conceived of language as an aspect of “intellectual development,” 
a form of knowledge accumulation rooted in cognitive development but different from it 
(see, for example, Piaget 1962). Vygotsky and Piaget are now venerable historical figures, 
but their lessons continue to be very influential in many quarters (to wit, see below for 
the seal of Vygotsky in our own approach). Besides, whether their influence is explicitly 
recognized or not, the Vygotskyan/Piagetian tradition is clearly kept alive in current 
approaches of the likes of William Labov, Terrence Deacon, Michael Tomasello, Simon 
Kirby, or Morten Christiansen and Nick Chater, to cite a few (see, for example, Deacon 
1997; Tomasello 2001; Kirby et al. 2007; Labov 2007; Christiansen & Chater 2008). 
Curiously enough, it has even permeated some relevant representatives of Chomskyan 
formal linguistics, exemplarily Jan Koster (Koster 2009). The following quotation from 
Christiansen and Chater aptly epitomizes this stance—but note that other use-based or 
performance-oriented models (e.g. Hawkins 1994; 2004) would also make suitable points 
of reference:
Language has adapted through cultural evolution to be easy to learn to pro-
duce and understand. Thus, the structure of human language must inevitably be 
shaped around human learning and processing biases deriving from the structure 
of thought processes, perceptuo-motor factors, cognitive limitations, and prag-
matic constraints. Language is easy for us to learn and use, not because our brains 
embody knowledge of language, but because language has adapted to our brains. 
(Christiansen & Chater 2008: 490)
It is important to stress that “language” is used in this fragment in a neo-Saussurean 
way, i.e. as an object external to the human organism, with which the latter maintains a 
“symbiotic” relation (the expression is also from Christiansen & Chater 2008, in the same 
page).1 According to the congenial approach of Kirby and coworkers, biological predis-
positions for language are not of a linguistic kind, and the form of languages is mostly a 
function of how cultural transmission works. The neo-Saussurean breath of this current 
of linguistic thought is particularly transparent in Koster, who basically equates language 
and words, and claims:
 1 More recently, in Christiansen & Chater (2016), the expression “language itself” is repeatedly used to refer 
to such externalized entity. We believe that Christiansen and Chater’s approach is unconvincing for two 
main reasons. Firstly, they obviate that the kinds of constraints referred to in the quotation of the main 
text may act on language design, and still be at the service of a language-devoted, even a language-specific 
mental mechanism. Actually, this is in a nutshell one of the central claims of Chomsky’s minimalism, as we 
understand it. Secondly, they a priori disregard the possibility that external items may exert a constructive 
and constraining effect on internal machinery (see below in this paper). In any event, theirs and similar 
approaches certainly deserve a more nuanced discussion (see, for example, Trettenbrein 2015, commenting 
on Christiansen & Müller 2015).
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Under any meaningful definition, a language minimally contains words. Words are 
 man-made cultural objects (no matter how many biological constraints there are on 
possible words) and they do not belong to any particular individual but are external in 
the sense that they are stored in media, in the memory parts of brains, in dictionaries 
and other books, etc. In that sense, words are E-elements that belong to a speech com-
munity. If I die, the Dutch language will in all likelihood survive. (Koster 2009: 8–9)
According to Koster, language consequently relates to biology just as an object of an 
“applied biology” of sorts (Koster 2009: 64), in the sense that it obviously results from 
the application of human natural resources, without however being one such resource 
in itself. The most prominently shared feature of all these socio-culturally biased views 
on language is, according to our exegesis, that it grants that speakers are—borrowing 
Labov’s (2007) terms—efficient “transmitters” and “diffusors” of linguistic conventions 
(old and new), yet without exerting too much influence on the exact character of said 
conventions, beyond the minimal encoding requirements that the brain imposes as an all-
purpose receptacle, an assumption, by the way, that is perceived as questionable by some 
researchers in the field of cultural evolution; see Charbonneau (2015; 2016).
The opposite side of this first axis of disagreement is, obviously enough, what Jackendoff 
refers to as “the contemporary view of language,” or Kirby et al. (2007: 5241) as the “ortho-
dox evolutionary/biolinguistic approach.” Both expressions aptly capture the shift that took 
place in the mid 20th Century from externalist views of language to an internalist stance like 
the one brought about by the ground-breaking work of Noam Chomsky (Chomsky 1986). 
Language is conceived of within this alternative conception as a bona fide organ of the brain, 
details of which remain refractory to kinds of observation routinely applied as regards other 
organs (Chomsky 1980), but nevertheless a system to be related with biology as usual. 
Anderson and Lightfoot’s (2002) vindication of the language organ, for example, is based 
on the suggestion that cognition must be generally integrated into physiology (the study 
of organic functions), and language deciphered as a specific form of cognitive physiology. 
According to them, this perspective allows progression of linguistics as a branch of biol-
ogy despite uncertainties regarding the ultimate anatomical bases of the language organ, 
for there exists no motivation “for a sharp delineation between functional organization 
that is associated with discrete anatomy and that whose relation to physical implementa-
tion is less obvious and discrete” (Anderson & Lightfoot 2002: x). Whatever the situation 
one actually confronts, physiology seems to provide “an appropriate level of abstraction 
at which significant generalizations about biological determined function can be stated” 
(same page; see Gallistel 2010, for a similar stance). An important associated tenet of this 
“contemporary biolinguistic orthodoxy” is that the external stimuli to which the language 
organ is reactive to do not constitute an object in itself, or at least not one to which rele-
vant linguistic properties can be coherently ascribed. If any, “E(xternal)-language” shows 
properties but only derivatively from those of the mind/brain itself (Chomsky 1986). This 
issue is crucial in regard to our argument, so we shall presently turn to it.
As for the second axis of disagreement, it pertains to the general issue of modularity as 
debated in the field of psychology, particularly since the publication of Fodor (1983). 
Language shows for many all the signatures of a well-defined and self-contained form-
function unit, parallel to other similar brain specializations (face recognition, motor plan-
ning, early vision, etc.). Steven Pinker and Ray Jackendoff are paradigmatic supporters of 
this position. For them (Jackendoff & Pinker 2005; Pinker and Jackendoff 2005),  language 
comprises a series highly specialized components (phonology, morphology, syntax) with 
idiosyncratic properties relatively to other component parts of cognition (aspects of 
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semantics being reasonably an exception). No correlates of such language-specificities 
are consequently expected to exist in other non-human organisms. However, Chomskyan 
internalists have advanced toward a mainstream position that envisions language as a 
composite of different brain specializations, jointly laying down an emergent functional-
ity (like, for example, vision), but which may happen to be, individually taken, unspecific 
as for their linguistic dedication. The trend, the origins of which can be traced back to 
the influential Hauser et al.’s (2002) paper, is rightly characterized in Boeckx (2012) as 
a “mosaic” approach to I(nternal)-language. A salutary effect of this approach is that it 
has invigorated the comparative approach to unprecedented levels of detail (Fitch 2011). 
An unexpected one is that it paves the way to a convergence of sorts between Chomsky’s 
internalism and cognitive, externalist-inclined approaches, traditionally opposed to the 
biolinguistic orthodoxy (see Croft & Cruse 2004). What one now observes is that they 
lead together (programmatically or not) to the dissolution of a well-delimited concept of 
language.
But to be fair, the situation is more convoluted regarding both axes than the previous 
clear-cut distinctions may suggest, for many middle ground positions exist that compli-
cate the picture. For example, some pluralist positions underscore the necessity of telling 
apart the external and the internal concept of language, granting existence to both their 
referents and relating them with different kinds of evolutionary dynamics. This position 
was defended, for example, by Balari & Lorenzo (2013: Chapter 1) for methodological rea-
sons—but discarded afterwards (Balari & Lorenzo 2015a), as well as in Bickerton (2014: 
Chapter 9), whose diagnostic of the overall situation is summed up in the following pas-
sage, which focuses on the particular case of syntax:
In retrospect it seems bizarre that nobody, throughout this debate, proposed a 
principled and systematic distinction between those parts of syntax that were bio-
logically given and those that had to be acquired through acculturation into one of 
the many thousands of speech communities. (Bickerton 2014: 274)
The seal of pluralism can also be guessed in some current approaches that try to blend 
variationist sociolinguistics with Chomskyan formal linguistics—for some representative 
papers, see Cornips & Corrigan (2005).
Such pluralist stances, however, are somehow on the verge of becoming a bizarre 
position themselves, for they carry with them the danger of giving breath to a strong 
“culture/biology” divide (Michel & Moore 1995; Oyama 2000; see also Epstein 2016, 
for some valuable comments regarding the case of language), which keeps apart the 
 behavioral/psychological dimension of language, on the one hand, and its biologically 
proper underpinnings, on the other hand, taken as if they were different  (somehow 
 mysteriously connected) realms for which a more integrative ontology appears to be a 
misguided reductionist project. It is obvious enough that such a form of dualism ultimately 
refers to the classic “mind/body” counterpart, a reason strong enough to be suspicious 
of such a route, beyond its practical advantages when taken just methodologically. The 
route is however taken, for  example, in Boeckx & Benítez-Burraco (2014), who respect 
the distinction between languages  (external systems of grammatical conventions), on the 
one side, and their biological underpinnings, on the other side. Consequently, their posi-
tion runs into a neo-Piagetian stance of sorts (Boeckx 2014), in that biologically speaking, 
for them language (in the latter sense) boils down to a “readiness” to acquire and use 
languages (in the former sense), a state of the human brain that does not entail an organ 
proper beyond the brain itself. Such a position suspiciously looks like a return to a form of 
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dispositional analysis in a new disguise (see Chomsky 1980: 48–49, for a critical appraisal 
of dispositions).
Things are not less complex regarding the second axis of differentiation. As a matter 
of fact, in the aftermath of Hauser et al.’s (2002) paper, a new kind of dualism has sur-
reptitiously emerged that tells apart what is considered as properly biolinguistic within 
the human organism (unique) and what is just biological (shared) (Berwick et al. 2013; 
Bolhuis et al. 2014; Berwick & Chomsky 2016), pinpointing the former as providing the 
limits of language as a human faculty. Note that this is a move for which no reflexes are 
found in the study of other non-human organic units at any level of analysis, maybe due 
to an anthropocentric bias that seems to show up as soon as we confront the study of 
certain pinnacles of human cognition. Of course, there is nothing wrong with saying that 
humans are “special” insofar as they have language, a key characteristic of our species—
as rightly pointed out by an anonymous reviewer. In any event, there lingers the danger 
of reification in postulating such a specific vs. non-specific divide, for biology does not 
respect these kinds of boundaries: Whatever language happens to be, it is language root 
and branch; biologically speaking, there cannot exist more linguistic or less linguistic 
parts of language.
The overall situation is admittedly confusing, one that seems to drive to the stagnation, 
if not the complete collapse, of the enterprise of disentangling the evolutionary origins of 
language, and with it, the promise of turning linguistics into a bona fide natural science. 
Not surprisingly, Hauser et al. (2014) close a recent influential paper on the prospects of 
evolutionary linguistics with a rather pessimistic note, in which they underscore the pov-
erty of our present state of understanding about the phenotype to be explained, as well as 
the lack of solid methods and clear evidence as potentially leading to such a stagnation. In 
any event, the good news for those of a more optimistic temper, is that questions parallel 
to the ones reviewed up to here—the cause of similar angsts in other fields of biology in 
the past—have been the target of recent eco-evo-devo (short for ecological evolutionary 
developmental biology) oriented analyses (Gilbert & Epel 2009) that are paving the way 
to a clarification of the issues of concern. Eco-evo-devo relies on the foundational idea 
that the organism and aspects of its environment engage in non-trivial developmental 
units of action, which may be subject to reliable intergenerational transmission and thus 
acquire evolutionary import in the long run. It thus offers a very suitable model for the 
integration of the external and the internal also in the case of human language. The main 
aim of this paper is to work out such an idea. Its organization is the following. Section 2 
is first devoted to disentangle the drawbacks of the external vs. internal divide as tradi-
tionally and more recently envisioned within the Chomskyan paradigm. Section 3 then 
focuses on a developmentally inspired alternative that abolishes the distinction in favour 
of a new “hybrid” concept of language. Thereafter, section 4 explores the impact of this 
alternative view, if on track, on the conceptualization of language acquisition as a par-
ticular, non-exceptional aspect of organic development. Some concluding remarks close 
the paper.
2 The internal and the external: A first approximation
Orthodox biolinguistics (in the sense of the previous section) is a deeply internalist enter-
prise, which as a matter of fact has advanced in the last years to an even more radical 
position (to wit, see Chomsky 2016; 2017). From a historiographical perspective, the 
origins of Chomskyan internalism must be traced back to Chomsky’s (1959) early rejec-
tion of Skinnerian psychology, the at the time rampant interpretation of the processes 
leading to the complex inventories of abilities exhibited by organisms under natural or 
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artificial conditions. As it is well known, behaviorism relied on a radical eliminativism 
of the mental, thus privileging the causal role of the environment on the psychologi-
cal make-up of organisms, humans included. Chomsky’s demolition of the behaviorist 
 edifice is a well-known story, which has been told many times. The aspect of the story 
that we want to stress here is that the expected move that followed towards a strong 
internalist stance has not been rectified throughout the subsequent decades, as one would 
expect as the paradigm tried to synchronize with biological theory under the umbrella 
term of  “Biolinguistics” (Chomsky 2007a; Boeckx & Grohmann 2012). On the contrary, 
Chomsky’s internalism is now more radical than ever. So, in reviewing the internalism of 
mainstream biolinguistics, a distinction is in order between what we will refer to as the 
“garden variety” and the “new wave” of the internalist stance.
2.1 Garden variety internalism
According to Chomsky’s (1986) review, most theoretical approaches to language until the 
mid-20th Century and even beyond, have targeted an externalized concept of language 
(E-language) as its subject matter. Such a concept (and variants thereof) is a common 
ground that traverses as diverse viewpoints as those of Saussurean and Bloomfieldian 
linguistics, Skinnerian psychology, or Quinean and Putnamian philosophy—just to cite 
a few representative examples (Saussure 1916; Bloomfield 1933; Skinner 1957; Putnam 
1967; Quine 1970; see also Lewis 1975 and Dummet 1989). In Chomsky’s own words, 
these approaches “tended to view a language as a collection of actions, or utterances, or 
linguistics forms (words, sentences) paired with meanings, or as a system of linguistic 
forms or events” (Chomsky 1986: 19). Crucial to all instances of the resulting E-language 
concept was that “the construct was understood independently of the properties of the 
mind/brain” (Chomsky 1986: 20), a feature that according to Chomsky’s critique leads 
to a flaw in the corresponding approaches: “Questions of truth and falsity do not arise” 
(Chomsky 1986: 20) concerning such an object, for any grammar whatsoever that cor-
rectly characterizes a given E-language would be as good as any other capable of doing 
the same job. As a matter of fact, the feature is assumed as innocuous by the likes of 
Quine and Lewis, but according to Chomsky this is just the signal that in treating gram-
mars as arithmetical systems for which no particular concern exists in selecting among 
extensionally equivalent grammars, their approaches do not qualify as bona fide empiri-
cal enterprises. The same conclusion follows, according to Chomsky, from externalism at 
large: It dubiously allows the leap from descriptively to explanatorily adequate theoretical 
approaches (Chomsky 1965).
A shift of focus towards an internalized concept of language (I-language) is required by 
such an aim, which is thus a move not just methodologically motivated for a mere ques-
tion of division of labor, contrarily to Lohndal and Narita’s (2009) interpretation; see 
Lassiter (2010) for discussion. According to the internalist trend, an I-language “is some 
element of the mind of the person who knows the language, acquired by the learner, and 
used by the speaker-hearer” (Chomsky 1986: 22). Consequently, it is an object of study of 
the cognitive and brain sciences, which respectively make “statements about structures of 
the brain formulated at a certain level of abstraction from mechanisms” and further try to 
“discover the mechanisms that are the physical realization” of said structures (Chomsky 
1986: 22–23). Obviously enough, the shift is not trivial, for the internal structures of 
concern are supposed not to be just mental reflexes of certain external correlates—i.e. 
“actions, or utterances, or linguistic forms (word, sentences) paired with meanings,” but 
generative systems that underlie these and an indefinite number of other similar actions, 
utterances, or forms, with which the person who knows/learns/uses the language has 
 possibly had no prior acquaintance whatsoever. And maybe more important than that, 
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the shift of focus is clearly non-trivial because it allows us to make sense of features of the 
design of language without direct external reflexes, to begin with the one that Chomsky 
identifies as its Basic Property: namely, the fact that it “provides an unbounded array of 
hierarchically structured expressions,” in his own recent formulation (Chomsky 2016: 4). 
Classical observations from the field of language acquisition, like the fact that learners 
easily derive the structure-dependent character of many rules of grammar from a linear 
flow of speech, without particularly informative cues or external aid (Chomsky 1967; 
Crain & Nakayama 1987), likewise only make sense if referred to the hardwired modus 
operandi of a generative I-system, instead of to its E-outcomes.
2.2 New wave internalism
Throughout the last decade or so, Chomsky has advanced towards an extreme variant of 
the internalist stance, which is nicely summarized in Chomsky (2016). In a nutshell, the 
position boils down to the idea that the natural correlate of the I-language concept must 
be located even deeper than previously thought in the architectural organization of the 
human mind/brain, for language is, firstly and above all, a thought-composing device, to 
which externalization mechanisms—though obviously organism-internal, serve a mere 
secondary or ancillary purpose. In support of this idea, Chomsky elaborates a number of 
arguments, which may be summed up as follows.
From an intra-linguistic perspective, to begin with, the Basic Property—as 
defined above—pertains to the (deep) stratum of language that takes expressions as 
 content-bearing entities (Chomsky 2016: 4). Note that hierarchical structure is the 
crux of the matter of compositionally complex meanings—with its plethora of inclu-
sion, scope, and other asymmetric relations, but a negligible aspect of the externalized 
reflexes of the corresponding expressions. Complementarily to this formal argument, a 
functional one is also based on Chomsky’s (2016: 14) perception that externalization 
is rarely used: “Most use of language use [sic] by far is never externalized.” In other 
words, most of our linguistic endeavors are exploratory—private reasoning, planning, 
rehearsal, and so on, maybe preparatory efforts for those (relatively) rare occasions 
when we share their content with others.
Chomsky derives two extra arguments in support of the position from the following 
inter-linguistic observations. Firstly, there is not a unique or exclusive system of exteriori-
zation within the reach of languages—as witnessed by the hundreds of currently attested 
sign languages used by deaf communities worldwide, which indisputably are capable 
of expressing the same kinds of complex thoughts (Chomsky 2016: 13–14). Secondly, 
 language variation appears to concentrate on the externalization side—namely, the super-
ficial packaging of thought atoms in morphological units, and morphophonology. If it 
exists at all—see Chierchia (1998) and Ramchand & Svenonius (2008), variation seems to 
be negligible in the thought-related side of language (Chomsky 2016: 125).
Finally, Chomsky also draws an argument from an inter-species perspective (Chomsky 
2016: 41ff), for language-articulated thought strongly contrasts—or apparently so—with 
the simplicity of the content of the calls and other kinds of signals employed by non-
human organisms. As for the latter, fast and clear means of externalization seem to be the 
crucial property of the corresponding systems; contrarily, language seems to prioritize 
means capable of creating complex, sometimes highly convoluted expressions.
This array of arguments is maybe not exhaustive, but it suffices to understand the ration-
ale behind Chomsky’s conclusion that we should keep apart language proper—or language 
“in the narrow sense,” as in Hauser et al. (2002), from the different systems  (morphology 
> phonology > phonetics) contingently recruited for externalization. As already 
stressed, the externalization apparatus is “external” relatively to the thought-related, 
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properly linguistic one, yet “internal” to the human organism. Certainly enough, Chomsky 
has not completely thrown the classic I-language concept out of the window—as cor-
rectly pointed out by an anonymous reviewer, but we believe that a suitable characteri-
zation of his current thinking on this subject matter is one that differentiates between 
an “I-externalization,” communication-related component, and an “I-language” proper, 
thought-related one. Chomsky’s contention is that they are autonomous components of 
the human mind, the connection between which derives from a recent evolutionary event, 
which purportedly did not have a significant impact on the latter (Chomsky 2010). The 
net effect of such a radical re-internalization move is that Chomsky’s biolinguistics looks 
doomed to belong under a (arguably extant) strict organism-internal branch of biology, to 
which the study of environment-organism interfaces can be safely put aside of the central 
concerns of the approach.2
2.3 Internalism: A first-off critique
Before explaining and justifying in detail our own view on this issue, a brief critical note 
on Chomsky’s new wave internalism is in order. Note that Chomsky’s long-held position 
is that language is, above any other functional consideration, an “instrument of thought” 
(Chomsky 2013: 139). A recent formulation of the tenet is again to be found in Chomsky 
(2016: 13), where he characterizes language as “a kind of ‘language of thought’—and 
quite possibly the only such LOT.” As a matter of fact, the idea that language is primarily 
an instrument for thought instead of an instrument for communication, has been part and 
parcel of Chomskyan linguistics almost from its inception (Chomsky 1968; 1980). In more 
recent times, an effort has been made by Chomsky himself to relate the view with the 
likes of Salvador Luria and François Jacob (Chomsky 2010: 55–59). The take-home mes-
sage is that I-language relates asymmetrically with the interfaces, privileging the semantic 
interface (Asoulin 2016). The conclusion gives grounds to the more extreme view that 
language and thought can ultimately be equated and the resulting system kept apart from 
externalization, a qualitatively different phenomenon. Thus, in many senses, it now looks 
like that Chomsky’s LOT is just Fodor’s LOT, while Chomsky’s “Externalization” is more 
aptly seen as the equivalent of Fodor’s “Language (module);” for some recent textual evi-
dence that this interpretation might be on the right track, see Chomsky (2017).
A closer inspection reveals that the conclusion relies on a premise that is not as prin-
cipled as it is supposed to be. For Chomsky’s main reason for deciding the primacy of 
thought over externalization is that the Basic Property holds in the case of (hierarchically) 
structured thoughts, but not in the case of the (linear) arrangement of units in discourse. 
The idea is explicitly introduced in Chomsky (2013), where said asymmetry is referred to 
as T, a principle that “holds generally as a principle of UG”:
(T) Order and other arrangements are a peripheral part of language, related 
solely to externalization at the SM interface, where of course they are necessary. 
(Chomsky 2013: 36)
However, the introduction of the property of hierarchical structuring as the “basic” one 
is somehow unprincipled. Within an alternative value system, the linear arrangement 
of units in externalized utterances could equally be pinpointed as “basic” by one privi-
 2 An anonymous reviewer points out to us a recent paper by Chomsky (Chomsky et al. 2017), in which he 
articulates a more moderate position, considering how the morphological subcomponent (a part of the 
externalization component) and the syntactic one (the core of language capacity) are actually intertwined. 
This position obviously deserves an attentive consideration. However, our inkling is that Chomsky has 
recently alternated between more radical and more moderate positions when writing alone (Chomsky 2013; 
2016) and when coauthoring papers (Berwick & Chomsky 2016), respectively.
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leging, for example, communication/pragmatics over conceptual-intentional thought. 
Within such a value system, priority would certainly be given to the morphophonological 
interface to the sensory-motor systems, as language would be, firstly and above all, an 
 instrument of communication.
An anonymous reviewer brings to our attention that the “secondary” character of linear 
or serial order in behavior relatively to the “basic” character of hierarchically organ-
ized ideas or thought may be referred to neurophysiological considerations like the ones 
already suggested by Karl Lashley in 1951 (Lashley 1951). We agree. The complexly 
integrative character of linguistic expressions may be the seal of higher-order cognitive 
processes that somehow fade in their behavioral reflexes: a “basic” vs. “secondary” dis-
tinction of sorts would then follow. It does not follow, however, that such an empirically 
grounded distinction contains any legitimating criteria regarding the kinds of “new wave” 
Chomskyan boundaries, or how the resulting mind specializations become ranked and 
regarded as more or less linguistic; especially because the distinction might not be as 
empirically well-grounded as it is traditionally assumed (see, for example, Rosselló 2016).
In the absence of such principled criteria, our claim is that the only functional charac-
terization that language deserves is that it “is for” whatever it may serve. This a different 
position relatively to Chomsky’s non-communicative but nonetheless functional approach: 
language “is for” something, it has a “proper” function—namely, composing thoughts. 
Granted that this is one of its commonest uses, but Chomsky’s surreptitiously functionalist 
stance does not really follow, just like the alternative communicative approach. Avoiding 
both stances sounds like a more reasonable choice. And as we presently see it, this non-
alignment toward functional considerations does not compromise in any relevant sense 
the advancement of the biolinguistic approach. Quite the contrary: if—as in the case of 
Chomsky—functionalism just serves as a last resort tactic for grounding the language 
proper/externalization strong divide, then functionalism is of no use once one becomes 
persuaded that the divide is not worth preserving anymore. Let’s see why we believe that 
this is the case.
3 The internal and the external: Rethinking boundaries
The interplay between the internal and the external is business as usual in whatever 
biological corner you choose. However, when it comes to the realm of cognition, such a 
statement is seen with some skepticism by many, due to its centrality in different failed 
or suspicious “naturalist” trends in psychology. The recurrent theme of such trends, 
according to Fodor’s (1981: 229) characterization, is “that psychology is a branch of 
 biology, hence one must view the organism as embedded in a physical environment. The 
 psychologist’s job is to trace those organism/environment interactions which constitute 
its behavior.” This is why, also according to Fodor, naturalism slumps onto behaviorism 
and embraces as central the following set of ideas: (a) mental states are individuated by 
reference to organism/environment relations; (b) such relations constitute the mental; 
and (c) consequently, one must abandon the characterization of the mental as formal (i.e. 
 computational) (Fodor 1981: 230). 
While the position that we articulate in this section is “naturalist” in Fodor’s most basic 
sense (“psychology is a branch of biology,” “organisms are embedded in a physical envi-
ronment”), yet it is one that does not collapse into behaviorism of any conceivable filiation. 
Rather, the section will hopefully serve as a demonstration that naturalism can easily coexist 
with a formal/computational view on mind. To such an aim, the section’s main contribution 
is based on current ideas on how “environmental cue-organismal response” mechanisms 
work at large and how such dynamics may be applied to the cognitive realm. As we hope 
to show, this general model, which entails a new, somehow defying “hybrid” concept of 
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language (and of organism), does not defy in any relevant sense the  computational mind 
viewpoint. Let us start by advancing some empirical motivation for the view.
3.1 Agreement morphology: Why is it there?
Our case relates with a kind of apparently simple units that have however proved par-
ticularly defying for linguistic theorizing: namely, agreement affixes like, for example, 
the English suffix –s associated to the ‘3rd person, singular’ of verbs in the present tense. 
These kinds of items have been the focus of much discussion within the Minimalist Pro-
gram (Chomsky 1995; and subsequent works), since they clearly challenge Chomsky’s 
instrumental thesis that language expresses thought in an optimal way: agreement affixes 
do not contribute to the thought compositionally expressed by phrases and sentences; 
they just mimic (redundantly) the feature composition of other concurrent units. The 
point is easy to capture if one thinks of the plural form of verbs in languages like Span-
ish—with relatively rich agreement paradigms, which does not entail a plurality of the 
referred kind of event: for example, construyen ‘they build’ (–n, ‘3rd person, plural’) does 
not entail more than one building event, but more than one builder, which is indepen-
dently expressed in the subject. So why are these items so conspicuous (Corbett 2009), if 
they seem to be alien to language as a thought-constructing device?
Chomsky’s answer to this question is intriguing: in a nutshell, agreement morphology is 
obviously there, but it should not. So, syntax must contain a computational procedure to 
“eliminate/neutralize” the corresponding non-interpretable/unvalued features, prevent-
ing them from reaching the thought-related interpretive interface (Chomsky 2000; 2004). 
The procedure uses a “probe-goal” mechanism of sorts, in the sense that agreement fea-
tures search for a target within the structural domain they asymmetrically command. As a 
way of illustration, let us think of a point in the derivation of an internal expression when 
a bundle of tense and agreement features merges to a previously composed verbal phrase, 
to jointly form a hierarchically higher inflectional phrase—inverted commas are intended 
to represent that at this level of representation expressions do not contain words, but bare 
“atoms” devoid of phonological form (Chomsky 2016):
(1) {‘present, 3sg’, {‘arrive’, {‘a’, {‘boy’}}}}
The inflectional bundle—the probe—then starts a search for a matching goal, which actu-
ally happens to exist within the accessed domain—namely, the phase {‘a’, {‘boy’}}. As a 
consequence, agreement features are deleted/valued and the expression becomes freed 
from uninterpretable material:
(2) {‘present, 3sg’probe, {‘arrive’, {‘a’, {‘boy’}}goal }}
Chomsky’s efforts to preserve his optimal LOT thesis are certainly ingenious. However, 
they are a far cry from explaining why agreement features are there to begin with. If 
any, the suggestion that they have to be somehow eliminated/neutralized makes their 
being there even more mysterious. In other words, Chomsky’s recent approaches to the 
matter appear not to have progressed too much from the early days when he declared 
these aspects of languages “imperfections” of the linguistic faculty (Chomsky 1995). The 
same objection rules for other Chomskyan-inspired alternatives: for example, the idea 
that agreement features are alien to the thought composing process and that they rather 
belong to late insertion morphological processes within the route to externalization. Not 
surprisingly, defenders of this view refer to them as “ornamental morphology” (Embick & 
Noyer 2007). But why should speakers embellish externalized expressions?
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Functionalist approaches to language have also tried to make sense of agreement 
 phenomena by associating carriers of agreement features to some practical role, like  fixing 
discourse referents, attenuating the effects of noise in communicative uses of  language 
by creating redundancies, and so on (Barlow & Ferguson 1988). That agreement mark-
ers serve to these and surely other purposes seems trivially correct. However, the most 
reasonable interpretation is that they are able to fulfill whatever role (not some specific 
role, an important qualification) that fits with what they are. This is again in agree-
ment with the “neutralist” stance advanced in the previous section: it is their being there 
in the first place what explains their propensity to serve an open array of language-
related services—not the other way around; for a congenial approach, see Biberauer & 
Roberts’ (2017) “Maximize Minimal Means” idea, suggested there as a third factor bias 
on acquisition.
Attending to such a problematic landscape, Balari and Lorenzo (2015a) tentatively out-
line the idea that agreement material is so conspicuous in languages because it helps 
to strengthen and stabilize the computational system that underlies the processing of 
internal linguistic expressions. The thesis put forward thus boils down to the idea that 
agreement items are there—in the words of Minelli (2003)—for their “developmental 
role,” which also according to Minelli is “prior” to any other role whatsoever that units 
of the corresponding realms may later acquire in their respective organic contexts. Let us 
explore here the import of this idea of the priority of developmental role with some detail.
Language takes advantage of the powerful computational capabilities of the human 
brain, which make possible that units within linguistic expressions engage not just in local 
dependencies—{a {boy}}, but also in long-distance ones—{said1 {that a boy betrayed 
him} very clearly1}; where boldface and subscripts respectively represent these connec-
tions. This corresponds to a high level of complexity according to standard formaliza-
tions—details are not relevant at this point. However, according to the same standards, 
natural languages exhibit a further level of complexity in that expressions are apt to 
contain units that relate interspersedly—i.e. crossing different long-distance connections, 
as in {he2 {said1 {that the boy betrayed him2} very clearly1}; superscripts are intended 
now to express these kinds of connections. In order to process such complex connective 
patterns, a computational system must incorporate a powerful “working space” compo-
nent, in which to keep in active memory partially composed expressions until all connec-
tive links are resolved. Observing that agreement affixes are typically involved in these 
kinds of indeterminately distant connections—e.g. a boy1 who no one2 except me knows2 
arrives1, Balari and Lorenzo (2015a) claim that said units have the developmental role of 
eliciting, exciting and guiding the exercise of the working space of the human computa-
tional system, until it attains its proper storage capacity. Note that the idea is compatible 
with the possibility that later on other functions hitchhike on the same items. But contrary 
to other proposals, the suggestion offers an explanation about why they are there to begin 
with. Balari and Lorenzo’s take home message is that agreement morphology does not 
just serve learners to capture correct connective patterns, but that it directly impacts on 
the organic growth of the very system that serves to learn and to compute these patterns 
once learned. This is obviously a strong enough claim that asks for empirical justification.
Before taking the perspective of development proper, we want to emphasize first that 
different linguistic phenomena appear to encourage the idea that agreement relations are 
commonly held disregarding the kinds of functional motivations routinely associated with 
them. In cases like these, the most suitable interpretation seems to be that agreement is 
held just for the sake of agreement itself. It is our contention that this actually corresponds 
to the, so to speak, primeval condition of agreement—i.e. irrespective of its potential for 
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added functional accommodations. The kinds of cases that we have in mind have been the 
focus of recent attention under different tags, like “omnivorous” (Nevins 2011) or “failed” 
(Preminger 2014) agreement.
One such case, commented in Nevins (2011: 949–959), is a pattern in which the verb 
incorporates an agreement morpheme for number that shows up under the condition that 
the subject, the object, or both, refer to pluralities. This is the case, for example, of the 
following verbal phrase in Georgian, in which the plural marker –t does not unequivocally 
agree with the subject or the object, resulting in “potentially massive ambiguity” (from 
Nevins 2011: 950; ex. 15):
(3) Georgian (Nevins 2011)
g-xedav-t.
2obj-saw-pl
‘I saw you all; we saw you all; he saw you all; we saw you.’
The Georgian case resembles, as pointed out by an anonymous reviewer, the behavior of 
“number” in languages, like Halkomelen Salish, in which it is described as a modifier adjoined 
to the corresponding lexical category, instead of as an inflection item embodied as a func-
tional head (Wiltschko 2008). The contention may thus be made that agreement items devel-
opmentally derive from the former condition and eventually attain the latter, thus stabilizing 
and regularizing their behavior—or not, as witnessed by the Halkomelen Salish data. Such 
an interpretation appears to be congenial to the developmental data to be presented below.
Another interesting example is the case of the Quichean agent/focus (‘af’) construction 
studied by Preminger (2014: 18–22). In this construction, the phrase referring to an agent 
is focused, so the transitive verb behaves in an intransitive-like manner: it takes just one 
agreement marker of the absolutive paradigm, which however shows up with a feature 
composition that does not uniformly correspond with the patient or the agent. How the 
marker is chosen depends in this construction on a hierarchy that privileges the first and 
second person over the third, and the plural third person over the singular. As a result, 
the verb agrees with the agent in some cases like (4a) below, but with the patient in other 
cases, like (4b) below (from Preminger 2014: 20, ex. 18; note that the phenomenon is not 
Quichean-specific, but it is also found, e.g. in Hungarian, as documented in Bárány 2015):
(4) Quichean (Preminger 2014)
a. ja yïn x-in-ax-an ri achin.
foc me asp-1sg.abs-hear-af the man
‘It was me that heard the man.’
b. ja ri achin x-in-ax-an yïn.
foc the man asp-1sg.abs-hear-af me
‘It was the man that heard me.’
Details of the corresponding constructions are not relevant to the purposes of this paper. 
We simply find them illustrative of the fact that agreement units do commonly not depend 
upon identification or disambiguation purposes. They apparently are there just for the 
sake of agreement itself.
From a developmentally proper perspective, an illustrative case in support of the idea 
is already offered in Balari and Lorenzo (2015a) based on child German, where the 
 morphology for subject agreement is highly idiosyncratic relatively to the adult German 
 counterpart. Let us extend and work out a little bit the data analyzed there. 
Children use in some cases different endings for the same features, while adults do not 
(upper part of Table 1), and complementarily, the former unify different features in a 
 single ending, where the latter use specialized contrasts (lower part of Table 1).
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Technically speaking, the child system is a “degenerate” and “redundant” one (Edelman 
& Gally 2001), which makes it of dubious utility for the kinds of adult roles customarily 
thought of to be the proper function of the system—e.g. identifying discourse referents. 
A worth stressing observation is that children do not behave randomly in this area: They 
follow their own (i.e. child specific) regularities. Crucial to Balari and Lorenzo’s main 
point is that as pinpointed in Bateson & Gluckman (2011), the two properties referred to 
above—degeneracy and redundancy—are typical of developmental systems at large, so 
an agreement system exhibiting said properties may also perfectly well subserve the sug-
gested developmental role. In this respect, some extra developmental data from German 
learners seem to be particularly informative: 
(A) the regularities of concern emerge just before children engage in computa-
tionally complex constructions like (significantly enough) relativization, which 
typically widens the distance between long dependent constituents (age 2;6)—
see Mills (1985); and
(B) children with so-called “Grammatical Agreement Deficit” (Clahsen 1986; Clah-
sen et al. 1997; Clahsen & Hansen 1997) concurrently exhibit difficulties with 
complex computational tasks like verb movement from final to second posi-
tion, which creates another typical instance of long-distance dependency in 
German. Interestingly enough, Clahsen & Hansen (1997) report that significant 
spontaneous recovery in this latter area is observed after intensive training 
with agreement alone.
Relevant data can also be adduced from a broader cross-linguistic perspective. Going 
beyond the classical morphological locus of affectation in cases of Specific Language 
Impairment (SLI)—see, for example, Bortolini et al. (1997) for Italian, or Bedore & Leon-
ard (2001) for Spanish, a large body of research demonstrates that high level computa-
tional tasks like question formation are also affected in the same condition—see van der 
Lely & Battel (2003) for English, or Hamann (2006) for French; see also Vares (2017) for 
a detailed study of both domains in a SLI population of Spanish speaking children. Balari 
and Lorenzo’s suggestion points to the conclusion that a causal link exists from the former 
(morphological) to the latter (syntactic) domain.
Now, what is exactly the moral of this linguistic detour? Two details are worth emphasiz-
ing before deriving the desired conclusions: firstly, contrary to other properties of linguistic 
expressions (for example, structural hierarchy), agreement morphology is conspicuously 
“visible” (or “overt”) in externalized utterances; and secondly, taking advantage of items 
overtly present in the adult input, learners construct and rapidly internalize idiosyncratic 
systems of agreement—as clearly attested in the case of child German reviewed above, 
which according to our hypothesis they immediately put into a developmental use that 
targets the computational system in charge of composing internal, hierarchically struc-
tured expressions. So, we have equally good reasons to attribute these kinds of units both 
Table 1: Child vs. adult subject agreement in German. Sources: Clahsen (1986); Clahsen & Penke 
(1992).
Children (age ±2;0) Adults
first person, singular first person, singular
-en -e -Ø -e
third person, plural plural (except second person)
-en -en
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an external and an internal status, for on the one hand they mimic public models, while 
on the other hand they self-organize according to a learner-internal logic, and contribute, 
developmentally speaking, to the constitutive process of the inner machinery underlying 
complex linguistic computations.
3.2 Redefining boundaries: Enter hybrids
The above conclusion is not however particularly challenging if one adopts a broad bio-
logical perspective, for the kinds of cases brought to the fore in the previous section are 
not, at their corresponding level of organization, very different from other well-known 
cases in other biological realms. Many such cases are reviewed in Sultan (2015: Chapter 3) 
under the general category of “environmental cue/organismic response” mechanisms. 
Here we will make use of just one by way of illustration, which unrelated as it may 
appear to anything having to do with language, nonetheless offers a good abstract schema 
for what we think that is going on in the case of linguistic systems of morphological 
 agreement. 
The case refers to a particular species of sea slug (Elysia chlorotica), the main peculiarity 
of which is its brilliant green color. The reason for this exceptional coloration for a sea 
slug is that Elysia feeds on a yellow-green alga (Vaucheria litorea), from which the sea slug 
obtains chloroplasts that are incorporated into the cells of its digestive tract. Chloroplasts 
obtained by Elysia during the juvenile stage allow the animal to photosynthesize as plants 
do, to fulfill its metabolic needs throughout its 10-month life span. Chloroplasts are not 
transmitted to offspring (Rumpho et al. 2011; Sultan 2015: 32). So, in this case, biotic 
material external to the organism is assimilated and put into use as organelles within 
cells, allowing those animal cells to carry out the photosynthetic function. According to 
Sultan’s own conclusion: “The animal incorporates its (biotic) environment into its own 
development in the most profound way possible” (Sultan 2015: 32). The parallels with 
our own concerns are straightforward. Let us explore them with some detail.
Obviously enough, agreement affixes do not qualify as “biotic” in any meaningful sense; 
however, this is not particularly problematic, for many other examples from Sultan’s book 
show that abiotic factors (light, temperature, gases) may also participate in development 
and function and be assimilated for means similar to biotic counterparts like chloroplasts. 
Generally speaking, cue/response systems act as mechanisms that allow beneficial plas-
tic developmental, physiological and behavioral adjustments of organisms to proximal 
environmental conditions (Sultan 2015: 49). Crucially, such mechanisms entail certain 
perceptual and transduction steps between environmental cues and organismic responses, 
which exercise a key interface role in the generation of hybrid (environment/organism) 
dynamics.
As for the case that concerns us here, the associated perceptual and transduction steps 
are, to begin with, far from well understood at a fine grain level of neurological resolu-
tion. But this is business as usual when trying to trace the linguistic functions of the 
brain at that level of analysis (Poeppel & Embick 2005), as it exemplarily also happens 
with the system of computation that endows languages with Chomsky’s Basic Property 
(Dehaene et al. 2015). Notwithstanding, the representational/computational approach 
historically endorsed by Chomskyan linguistics seems apt to provide an abstract perspec-
tive (Chomsky 1980) from which to begin securing some relevant preliminary conclusions 
that, paradoxically enough, put seriously into question Chomsky’s extreme internalism.
According to the prevailing Chomskyan image of the architecture of language, Morphology 
is a specialized module within the externalization route (Chomsky 1995: 319ff), corre-
sponding to the point where, so to speak, an exchange takes place between the currency of 
the system of computation—i.e. bare bundles of abstract features purportedly taken from 
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a universal inventory, and a currency of language-specific stems and affixes associated 
to phonological representations—which in their turn instruct the sensory-motor systems 
(Halle & Marantz 1993). Thus, Morphology can be conceptualized as a critical transduction 
subsystem within an overall cue/response system: it identifies signaled pieces of environ-
mental stimuli as carriers of the kinds of features capable of exciting high-level computa-
tional activity—i.e. dependencies held at indeterminate distances, potentially embedded 
within similar dependences and/or obeying complex crossing patterns. According to the 
hypothesis put forward in the previous subsection, said environmental stimuli incite and 
help the computational system grow until it attains a specific complexity level, perhaps 
one equivalent to that of an enhanced pushdown automaton, according to the standard 
metric of the Chomsky Hierarchy (see Balari & Lorenzo 2013). The units of concern thus 
have a role in the developmental economy of the computational system, comparable to 
chloroplasts in the developmental contributions of photosynthesis in the case of the green 
sea slug. So, if this hypothetical parallel is on the right track, agreement morphemes are as 
much part of the linguistic environment (E-language) as part of the computational system 
(I-language), according to Chomsky’s compartments. In other words, just as the sea slug 
ingests part of its environment and integrates it in its own physiological function, human 
brains do the same with salient regularities at the level of speech and integrate them into 
their own cognitive function, transforming them into items of vocabulary (e.g. agreement 
morphemes) capable of exciting computational activity. Thus, human brains are “hybrids” 
in the same extent as sea slugs are hybrids (Sultan 2015: 32–33). We shall elaborate this 
conceptualization presently. Let us stress before how the suggested approach departs from 
Chomsky’s most recent internalist musings.
From a Chomskyan perspective, much of our contentions are not particularly defying. 
The internalist stance seems immune to the challenge, for Morphology, with the rest of 
the Externalization apparatus, is not part of the faculty of language properly speaking. 
Chomsky’s main justification is a functional one—as already explained: language is an 
instrument of thought and Morphology does not contribute to thought composition; it 
simply mediates in thought externalization. Morphology is just a piece of a language-
related but ancillary aspect of language proper. This ultimately functional justification is 
sometimes accompanied with the evolutionary claim that complex compositional thought 
(aka language) has had an autonomous history prior to its connection to externalization, 
which allegedly corresponds to a relatively recent evolutionary event—±50,000 years 
ago (Chomsky’s 2010 estimate; see also Bolhuis et al. 2014; Chomsky 2017, for the most 
recent exposition of the idea). 
Things however look very differently when adhering to a developmental perspective 
like the one adopted here. For according to this view, Morphology may not contribute to 
the online process of constructing an articulated thought, yet it may be crucially implied 
in the developmental process leading to a mature system capable of such constructive 
processes. When this developmental viewpoint is complemented with an evolutionary 
perspective—in other words, when an evo-devo perspective is adopted, then it seems 
inescapable to conclude that the kind of developmental role we are suggesting in regard 
to Morphology might have also had a relevant role in the evolution of the human-typical 
system of computation. While assumedly fallible, the ultimately developmental ground-
ing of our position has been supported by relevant empirical data (see 3.1). We honestly 
doubt that the ultimately functional grounding of Chomsky’s internalism can be empiri-
cally supported. It rather seems doomed to remain a metaphysical claim.
Let us concentrate now in the suggested “hybrid” conceptualization of language. The 
concept is specifically taken in the sense of James Griesemer, according to whom it 
refers to a biologically ubiquitous ontological status, participants of which are “material 
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individuals produced from several provenances and which hinder conceptualizing and 
tracking  stable units of investigation” (Griesemer 2014a: 24; see also Griesemer 2014b). 
Some of Griesemer’s preferred illustrations have to do with hybrids of biotic materials of 
different origins, which are nevertheless pinpointed as apt to help disentangle aspects of 
cultural development and evolution by similar admixtures of biotic and abiotic factors. 
Generally speaking, Griesemer applies the category to “developmental relations among parts 
formed by hybridization of system and environment” (our emphasis), which have a “facil-
itation” effect on “maintenance, growth, development, or construction” tasks that “would 
otherwise be more difficult or costly without” (Griesemer 2014a: 26). In this sense, the 
originally exogenous participant behaves as a “scaffold,” which in Griesemer’s words is 
“an entity, typically exogenous to the system, unit, or object of interest, which interacts in 
temporary association with a system to facilitate the development of an outcome or effect 
[…] otherwise […] difficult or impossible to achieve” (Griesemer 2014a: 47). Once the 
effect is achieved, the scaffold may be “removed” or it may become “invisible” (Griesemer 
2014a: 26); but while fulfilling the designated role, it is part of a developmental unit of 
the organism—i.e. an integral part of the organism itself.
Griesemer’s model applies as straightforwardly to the case of the developmental/func-
tional role of chloroplasts in the case of the green sea slug as to the case of the develop-
mental role of agreement affixes in the case of language. In the former case, taking in 
chloroplasts feeds the digestive tract facilitating the development of the protective mucous 
sheath; in the latter, affixes feed the computational system facilitating the development of 
a high-resolution working space. What obtains in both cases is hybrids that fulfill a devel-
opmental role within the respective organic scenarios. As suggested by Griesemer, such 
a characterization does not entail that the development of the system would not occur, 
were such units completely out of sight. This is particularly clear in our linguistic case, 
as witnessed by the fact that verbal agreement is utterly absent in some languages, like 
Chinese. But this is a normal expectation, if one takes into account that robust systems 
of development normally act redundantly (Bateson & Gluckman 2011; see Dove 2012 for 
the case of grammars). In the case of language, means other than verbal agreement—e.g. 
nominal case inflections (Baker 2001; 2015)—may replace or reinforce its developmen-
tal role, which surely may also be supplied by other reinforcing non language-specific 
stimulation.3
Obviously enough, when the system of computation attains a steady state, agreement 
morphology is not “removed” from the structure of verbal words; but it may not be inac-
curate to say that it becomes “invisible” from the point of view of thought computation, 
which is a nice way of accommodating Chomsky’s insights on the issue. The eventual-
ity that added non-developmental roles hitch-hike on these items is then but predict-
able, attending to Minelli’s (2003) plethora of examples of early structures fulfilling a 
developmental role—or behaving as “ontogenetic adaptations” in Oppenheim’s (1981; 
1984)  seminal term, and then serving to other non-developmental task in the same 
 3 An anonymous reviewer raises the interesting question of what happens when the sea slug does not man-
age to eat algae at the required developmental time, and whether algae may be replaced by some other 
resource. To our knowledge, what happens in these situations is that the sea slug loses weight dramatically 
and accommodates to a dark environment (Christa et al. 2014). In other words, it develops an alternative 
phenotype, which is accompanied by an alternative survival regime. The case of German children reviewed 
above shows that when children are not able to take advantage of agreement markers, an alternative com-
putational phenotype ensues—fortunately enough, more or less reversibly. Our tentative guess is that no 
other linguistic or non-linguistic resources can assume the same role in this case, since (under hypothesis) 
they only would be functional inasmuch as they show the kinds of patterns that children, to begin with, 
have difficulties to deal with.
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organism—e.g. cuticles or flagella serving as the means for restraining a developing form, 
then “recycled” into protective or motile structures. In this respect, languages offer a very 
diversified range of phenomena in the area covered in this subsection. For example, the 
agreement system of English is so impoverished that it can hardly be thought of as serving 
the kinds of pragmatic functions routinely ascribed to it, yet surely being practical enough 
for the excitatory role suggested here. German, in its turn, seems to offer a nice example 
of how agreement systems may “metamorphose” into more suitable versions to the prag-
matic roles at hand. What seems clear is that the early developmental role suggested here 
seems to offer a more coherent inter-linguistic view of why languages incorporate this 
kind of grammatical machinery.
At this stage of our developmental uptake on language, we must admit that the overall 
model is sketchy and that many important details still ask for clarification. Admittedly, 
even the non-trivial issue remains of how the model could possibly be operationalized in 
order to generate productive research applications. We believe, however, that nothing 
of the sort can be satisfactorily approached without a prior exploratory program aimed 
at disentangling the whole landscape, which is how we understand our current aim. 
Moreover, nothing thus far said should be read as claiming to contain the right analysis 
of the alleged pieces of empirical evidence, for which much more field research would 
ideally be required. So, for the time being, it is not particularly crucial for us whether, 
e.g. the child German data that we have provided contain the most accurate description 
of facts possible—obviously enough, inasmuch as facts are not overtly betrayed; rather, 
we are mostly interested in offering the general “environmental cue/organismic response” 
model for discussion to the field of language acquisition, having clearly in mind that its 
superiority relatively to other conceivable models is an empirical issue, and thus one to 
be ultimately decided by means of experiment and observation. In any event, we conceive 
of our current enterprise as a necessary preparatory step prior to such a desirable state of 
affairs.
That said, we nevertheless believe that the “environmental cue/organismic response” 
model is not one expected to eventually defeat “UG-based” models in the arena of empiri-
cal research. For one thing: it is not by means of “refutation” that one will prove its 
superiority and eventually prevail against the other. As we see it, the “environmental 
cue/organismic response” model is rather a sort of (friendly) eliminativist project rela-
tively to “UG-based” models. To clarify this point, let us briefly refer to a particularly suit-
able variant of the UG-based approach to language acquisition, namely, the “cue-trigger” 
model (Lightfoot 1999; see Biberauer & Roberts 2017: 137–139, for a brief presentation). 
In a nutshell, this model is based on the idea that fragments of E-language contain the 
designated “triggers” for “cues” encoded by UG. Thus, according to this model, “cues” are 
part of the genetic endowment of the learner, or—in other words—part of the a priori 
contribution of the organism to the course of acquisition. Alternatively, according to the 
“cue/response” model, “cues” originally belong to the environment and are embodied 
later on (Rupert 2009), thus eliciting the kinds of organic “responses” that transform 
the organism into a linguistic phenotype—with no language-specific genotypic mediation 
required. According to the former model, the environment fulfills the expectations of the 
organism, which accordingly reacts—e.g. by fixing this or that anticipated parameter; 
according to the latter, the organism just reacts to the environment, acquiring a linguistic 
form that is not anticipated neither in the environment or in its structure. 
In both cases, however, the attained steady states may be safely described by means 
of the same UG/parameters jargon. So according to our eliminativist stance, a particular 
 “cue-trigger” unit would simply be read as a way of black-boxing the developmental history 
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of a certain particular aspect of the steady state lacking obvious environmental reflexes. 
This corresponds to a well-known strategy for starting a research program—namely, by 
tagging phenomena of interest yet avoiding in-depth treatment, which is legitimate under 
the obvious condition that the tag does not remain in the long run as the putative expla-
nation of what was originally tagged as asking for explanation (Robert 2004; Craver & 
Darden 2013). Thus, the best way of characterizing a model like the “cue-trigger” one is 
by saying that it is not false—at least, not right away false, but provisional—i.e. waiting 
for being truly deciphered, which is how we envision the aim of the “cue/response” one. 
Suffice this reflection as an apt way of introducing the developmentalist challenge 
(Griffiths & Knight 1998; Longa & Lorenzo 2012; Lorenzo 2013) on language acquisition 
that we unfold more generally in the next section.
4 Rethinking language developmentally: Skyhooks and scaffolds
The previous section has offered a first approximation to the promiscuity between external 
and internal factors in language development. Before extending our case in this section, let us 
stress that our position is stronger than simply denying that language proper is fundamentally 
external or fundamentally internal; and even stronger that simply claiming that language is 
partially composed of external materials and partially composed of internal or organic machin-
ery. Our position is that considering how language grows in the mind of children, no such a 
division between the external and the internal seems to make particular sense. According to 
our illustrations, children appear to be attuned with aspects of the environmental stimulus, to 
which they seemingly react brute-causally, given their basic early computational endowment 
(Marcus et al. 1999; Gervain et al. 2012). We feel tempted to say that children’s computations 
“hook up to” properties of the world, similarly to our basic conceptual capabilities according to 
Fodor’s (1998) image. In any event, the properties of concern, once hooked up, do not remain 
just mimics of their external counterparts, but start a new life of their own, along which they 
serve as scaffolds to the computational development of children. Complementarily, the system 
of computation—a bona fide organic entity, according to our view—is in itself, attending to its 
etiology, so much an internal as an external thing: it is, according to our preferred characteri-
zation, a developmental hybrid. Our view is thus not aimed at providing a better arrangement 
of things external and internal as regarding language, but at dissolving the distinction into this 
hybrid category. The question certainly deserves some further clarification.
Firstly, an anonymous reviewer points out that the following question remains problematic 
for our approach: Chomsky’s main reason to reject an E-language concept parallel to the 
I-language counterpart is that the former cannot be coherently defined, contrarily to the lat-
ter; if so, the effort of somehow synthesizing them within an embracing H-language concept—
short for Hybrid-language—appears to be doomed to failure, as the resulting category will 
inherit the incoherence of one of its component parts—namely, E-language. The argument 
looks at first sight defeating, but it is not. To begin with, as pointed out above, let us stress 
again that our H-language concept does not purport refurbishing the original E-/I- divide; 
rather, it entails abolishing it, a move that is supported by the following three criteria for 
identifying bona fide developmental/organic units (Rupert 2009: 111–118), all of which are 
well known and considered unproblematic in the philosophy of biology and cognition.
(i) “Nontrivial Causal Spread.” Designated aspects of environmental stimuli have 
a developmental impact in the shaping of the organic machinery in charge of 
dealing with them. This makes such aspects suspect of  belonging to the same 
developmental/organic unit. The condition is necessary, yet not sufficient — as 
witnessed by the fact that it can be said fully fulfilled by  run-of-the-mill para-
metric approaches (Yang 2002; Baker 2003).
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(ii) “Generalized Transformation Principle.” Said aspects developmentally  fine-tune 
and enhance the capacities of the organic structure of concern, in ways oth-
erwise difficult or harder to attain. Again, the condition is necessary, yet not 
sufficient. Note, in passing, that this criterion is not in contradiction with the 
idea of “Learning Organ” fostered by Gallistel (2000; 2010), commented, ap-
provingly, by Chomsky (2002: 84–86), for example.
(iii) “Common Fate.” The transformational casual connection that obtains between 
the structured organism and the structured environment potentially makes 
them a single unit of inheritance—thus a single developmental/evolution-
ary entity; aka “inclusive inheritance” (Danchin et al. 2011). If fulfilled, the 
 condition is sufficient.
Note that as we move from (i) to (iii) within this logical framework, nothing remains that 
possibly resembles the marginal, incoherent, and inert status traditionally attributed to 
E-language.
Secondly, also raised by an anonymous reviewer, the charge could be made to our 
approach that it is but a restatement of the internalist position, so H-language is actually 
a refurbished version of I-language. However, we believe that this objection can only 
be sustained under a view of the I-language concept that makes the internalist position 
a trivial one. Let’s think on the related issue of the externalist vs. internalist concepts 
of meaning (Lau & Deutsch 2016). Even the more radical kind of externalist certainly 
assumes that mind-internal links exist that connect the individual with shared or public 
aspects of the environment, considered meaningful in themselves. But the fact, say, that 
H2O does not instantiate in the mind of the individual directly—i.e. as a clear, colorless, 
odorless, and tasteless liquid—when she has relevant thoughts about water, is not a coun-
terargument of the externalist thesis. Similarly, the fact that non-interpretive agreement 
morphology needs to be internalized by the speaker in order to exert the developmental 
role that we have suggested here, does not entail that the approach is internalist—but 
trivially. Non-interpretive agreement morphology items are environmental givens—a 
priori unexpected by the structure of mind, with the capacity of effecting a constructive 
influence on an internal mechanism, which generates a loop of mutually transformative 
influence that transforms them into a single integral system. They ultimately compound 
one and the same developmental system—thus a single organic unit, with no insides and 
outsides proper. In the case at hand, designated component parts of external sequences 
(E) have an impact on the internal sequencing mechanisms (I), which paves the way for 
the processing of more complex sequential patterns—Figure 1. What results is, according 
to our interpretation, a hybrid system of computation (H), which synthesizes the prior 
separate contributions of the mind and the environment.
Figure 1: A schematic representation of the hybrid constitution of the computational system. The 
figure partially mimics Gottlieb’s (1992) integrative model of probabilistic epigenesis.
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Once settled these points of clarification, this new section is devoted to deepen our 
developmental interpretation of language, emphasizing how the “scaffold” concept serves 
to (theoretically speaking) scaffold the interpretation itself. What we basically try to illus-
trate in the following pages, is how the idea of a scaffolded development of language 
may serve to overcome the biologically unrealistic idea that most of our basic linguistic 
endowment is somehow preformed in the mind of newborns, including a schedule of its 
timely unfolding. In other words, we presently try to offer the concept of “scaffold” as a 
developmentally viable alternative to the “skyhook” of Universal Grammar.
4.1 Scaffolded development
In the previous section, we explored the concept of “developmental scaffold” as recently 
put forward by James Griesemer to refer to entities typically exogenous to the organism, 
but which hybridize through their impact on development. Griesemer’s idea is to a cer-
tain point continuous with some current approaches within the extended mind paradigm 
(Clark 1997)—in their turn a vindication of Vygotsky’s seminal ideas (Vygotsky 1986), 
which stress how cognitive processes take advantage of designated environmental ele-
ments, recruiting and transforming them into constitutive parts of relevant computations 
themselves. In any event, we believe that there exists an important discrepancy between 
our hybridization-based model and Clark’s and other authors’ extended mind view (Clark 
& Chalmers 1998). According to the latter, scaffolding effects are directly exerted by envi-
ronmental items, while according to our own perspective and examples, it is only through 
processes of hybridization that said effects follow, also paving the way to further purely 
endogenous scaffolding phenomena. Thus, as suggested by our view, the environment 
does not dispense the mind from providing architectural and operative specializations rel-
evant to particular tasks: the environment has a developmental role in the complexifica-
tion of the mind, via processes of mind-environment hybridization. In the following pages 
we want to endorse the idea and to show that as a matter of fact, endogenous scaffolding 
effects are pervasive in the case of language, to the point of inspiring the conclusion that 
this scaffolding technique is the main force underlying the constructive processes of lan-
guages in the minds of speakers. In this subsection we offer grounds to the idea, which 
will be confronted to prevailing versions of the nativist stance in the next one.
A close inspection of the process leading to the earliest forms of linguistic competence—
say, somehow arbitrarily, the first three years of postnatal life, reveals that children fol-
low a path through which they successively and increasingly extend their abilities into 
the phonological, lexical and morpho-syntactic domains. The relevant facts and mile-
stones are nicely reviewed in, among others, Kuhl (2000; 2004), Guasti (2002), and 
Gervain & Mehler (2010), from whom we draw in the following expedient synthesis. 
Immediately after birth, children exhibit sound-related capacities that exceed what they 
could have obtained from simple acquaintance with the environmental stimulation. An 
illustrative well-established observation is that a few hours after birth, they can tell apart 
languages belonging to different rhythm typologies, even if their mother tongue—with 
which they are familiar from their intrauterine experience (Ramus et al. 1999)—is not 
included in the sample. This means that from birth children are sensorially attuned to 
very basic  phonological properties of languages. The observation is very much within 
the predictive range of Knudsen’s (2004) typology of neural circuitry, according to which 
circuits located near the sensorial or motor periphery are the ones prompter to unfold 
 endogenously—i.e. independently of experience, and to support the unfolding of other 
more plastic circuits/abilities. It seems therefore reasonable to conclude that this inborn 
sensorial  attunement to salient properties of the speech flow is the cat flap through which 
children start  approaching the formal subtleties underlying the surrounding stimuli.
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Such bootstrapping effect is first evidenced—accompanied by other simultaneous, but 
not so easily noticeable advances (Hirsh-Pasek & Golinkoff 1996)—in the phonological 
domain, where children attain the capacity of discriminating the most relevant distinctions 
of their native language at the end of the first year of postnatal life, with the exclusion 
of other inter-linguistically possible distinctions that they give signals of discriminating 
before that point (see Werker & Tees 2005, for a synthesis). This means that during the 
process, the phonological competence of children is not a replica of the caretakers’ coun-
terpart, for the former exceeds the discriminatory capacity of the latter. As a matter of 
fact, the child’s capacity for discriminating foreign distinctions is subject to progressive 
decay, showing that children traverse in this domain a series of stages with the signaled 
property of not being just drafts of the adult system: the child system is as much a sys-
tem converging at the surrounding adult counterpart, as a system departing from other 
possible instantiations of an adult system. For us, this is part and parcel of saying that 
the steady phonological stage is a hybrid system in exactly the sense of the previous sec-
tion, the unfolding of which is exogenously scaffolded by the phonetic instantiations of 
the native phonological distinctions. The litmus test for the idea is precisely the fact that 
early systems of phonological competence incorporate distinctions alien to the local adult 
counterparts. The task of learners is thus different from simply adding distinctions to an 
internal inventory. It rather is an extractive task of modeling (Mehler 1974), in which 
exogenous entities exert a scaffolding role—exactly in Griesemer’s sense, the final out-
come of which is an external/internal compromise of sorts—i.e. a hybrid.
First word-like units arise at around one year, thus concurrently with the point at which 
the child’s phonology converges with the adults’ distinctions. Word extraction is a non-
trivial task that children confront with the help of a phonological and statistical “self-aid 
kit,” which allows cracking the continuous speech flow and detecting likely “word can-
didates” (Kuhl 2000; 2004; Guasti 2002). Abilities other than these need to be recruited 
as well for establishing presumptive meaningful associations, a task to which the child’s 
social intelligence seems to critically contribute (Bloom 2000). In any event, it seems 
inescapable the conclusion that the phonological competence already in place exerts a 
crucial scaffolding influence on the construction of an early lexicon, in this case of an 
endogenous sort, taking into account, for example, the instrumental role of the identifica-
tion of typical segmental repetitions or the calculus of phonotactic regularities. Note also 
that the lexicon is a domain to which the litmus test of hybridization provides a positive 
result, for an early lexicon is not just a replica of a public or external lexicon. It obviously 
takes advantage of prominent entities within externalized utterances and points to a con-
vergent steady state of lexical competence relatively to other competent speakers, but it 
also contains word-like units and constructive principles or biases (e.g. the avoidance of 
homonymy/synonymy, phenomena which are pervasive in adult lexicons) alien to the 
purported models. A lexicon is thus a self-supporting developmental entity that relies on 
both exogenous and endogenous scaffolding effects, which makes it an exemplary illustra-
tion of a cognitive hybrid. 
Children’s adult-like productive word combinations are customarily dated at age two-
and-a-half. But chronology is surely an artifact also in this area, where the effect of having 
attained a certain critical mass of lexical items is commonly pinpointed as a crucial incit-
ing factor (Locke 1997; Bates & Goodman 1999). The case may be satisfactorily resolved 
in terms of the negotiation between the declarative memory system at the service of 
learning and storing words and the procedural memory system in charge of learning and 
subserving patterned word combinations, as in Michael Ullman’s model (Ullman 2001). 
Details are not important to our purposes in this section. Suffice it to say that were the 
idea on the right track, the same pattern previously suggested regarding other linguistic 
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domains seems to be active as well in this one: on the one hand, the lexicon thus far 
stored acts as an endogenous scaffold for productive syntax, while on the other hand, 
externalized utterances provide prominent entities (agreement, case, and so on) that con-
tribute as exogenous scaffolds, according to the view put forward in the previous section. 
Other endogenous and exogenous influences are probably also relevant to the effect—see 
Locke (1993) for some suggestions, but they putatively serve to strengthen the same idea: 
external and internal factors conspire to incite the workings of the computational system 
and to enhance its associated operative memory until it reaches its species-typical power.
4.2 Fighting skyhooks: A brief reflection
The preceding subsection points to an image of language according to which different 
customarily more or less agreed upon specialized subsystems find an unexpected source 
of justification for their “being there:” they play important developmental roles in the 
processes leading in due course to a full-fledged system of linguistic competence. In this 
respect, it is important to emphasize that the resulting picture is clearly more apt than 
other prevailing theoretical models for the accommodation of language to an unnegoti-
able premise of current developmental biology (Minelli & Pradeu 2014): Namely, that 
contrarily to folk intuitions, “development—as nicely put by George Michel and Celia 
Moore—emerges from earlier conditions; it is not directed toward later conditions” 
(Michel & Moore 1995: 21). Developmental processes are, appearances notwithstand-
ing, contingent, extremely sensitive processes to the here and now conditions. The fact 
that more often than not they lead to expected, predictable outcomes is not a primitive 
distinguishing feature of development, but itself an outcome of a conspiracy of mecha-
nisms that endow them with robustness. Development, in a nutshell, is neither somehow 
inscribed into initial or earliest stages, nor it has some “look ahead” power of sorts.
Some non-trivial consequences directly follow from the previous statements. Firstly, 
within the suggested framework it makes no sense to posit—along the lines of Borer & 
Wexler (1987) or Wexler (1990)—that a genetically encoded chronogram exists in charge 
of the timely unfolding of specific aspects of I-language. Chronograms are artifactual, not 
a genuine currency of developmental negotiations, milestones and progression. Stages are 
unexceptionally outcomes of contingent encounters of a previous stage and certain sur-
rounding exogenous and endogenous conditions (Lorenzo & Longa 2009). 
The “genetic chronogram” idea is not, to be fair, one around which a generalized con-
sensus has existed within Chomskyan linguistics. However, the most popular alternative 
to said thesis has traditionally been “radical preformationism,” according to which new-
borns are endowed with an inborn full linguistic competence that despite appearances, 
does not even develop. The idea has received different technical implementations along 
the years (Hyams 1986; Yang 2002), but all point to Chomsky’s contention that language 
can be studied not just under the simplifying heuristic of abstracting away the course of 
development, but taking as an empirically testable assumption that as a matter of fact it 
does not develop (Chomsky 2000). It is however hard to understand how an assumedly 
biological approach to language can take as one as its default premises one that trans-
forms language into a complete organic exception.
The advent of the Minimalist Program (MP) and the relaxation of claims about the 
existence of a linguistic genotype (Chomsky 2005) seemed to bring about the opportu-
nity of correcting the extreme traditional preformationist stance of Chomskyan linguistics 
(Lorenzo & Longa 2009; Longa & Lorenzo 2012). Things have not as a matter of fact fol-
lowed this path. The orthodox—or “consensual,” Hornstein at al. (2005)—interpretation 
of the MP is one that divorces the challenge of explaining why languages show their spe-
cific design properties and the challenge of explaining how children attain the knowledge 
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of objects with the designated properties without relevant models or instruction. The 
concerns are different, according to Chomsky’s (2004; 2007b) interpretation: the former, 
new goal leads to a level of theoretical adequacy that is “beyond” classical explanatory 
adequacy of the sort that the latter, traditional goal inspires. Explanatory adequacy relates 
with the aim of establishing the contents of Universal Grammar (UG); “beyond” that aim, 
a new one emerges that relates with the aspiration of understanding why UG is the way it 
is, instead of instantiating any other conceivable form. Chomsky’s view—aptly expounded 
in Hornstein et al. (2005)—is that the question of design that the MP raises does not touch 
the question of acquisition, which, according to the referred source, has already received 
a satisfactory general answer by positing an inborn, yet relatively plastic set of language-
specific principles in the mind of children—i.e. the Principles and Parameters Theory 
(PPT).
It is however dubious, to say the least, that the PPT contains a true answer to the ques-
tion of acquisition. As noted before, it rather black-boxes it, without providing bona fide 
explanations about how children really attain their mastery of language. Principles and 
parameters are descriptive categories of comparative grammar, each of them correspond-
ing, in terms of uniformity, to a different degree of cross-linguistic coverage. But against 
conventional wisdom, they lack any explanatory power on acquisition matters—which in 
classic Chomskyan terms means that they do not have explanatory power at all (Chomsky 
1965). However, this does not mean that they cannot get interpreted from the perspective 
of the theory of acquisition. According to one such possible reading, for example, “princi-
ples” may point to strongly “entrenched” factors in language development—in Wimsatt’s 
(1986) sense; see Dove (2012) for the case of grammar, while “parameters” may corre-
spond to “canalized,” yet more easily perturbable ones—in Waddington’s (1957) sense. 
Granted. But without losing sight of the fact that specific formulations of principles and 
parameters are descriptively abstract statements of aspects of the steady states of particular 
languages—with the double entailment that what they properly describe are “outcomes,” 
and that they are “adultocentric.” Enough to prove that they do not (can not) belong to 
the explanatory currency of a theory of development/acquisition. Again, this is not to 
deny that they may render an important instrumental service to the better understanding 
of acquisition, namely, when they assume the role of just tagging relevant phenomena, 
until a proper developmental understanding (i.e. along the lines suggested in this paper) 
may be provided. Otherwise, they just render lip service to the theory of acquisition.
On a more parochial tone, it is hard to understand that the MP, customarily thought 
of as a bona fide biological approach to language (Berwick & Chomsky 2016: Chapter 3), 
divorces, as a matter of principle, the goals of explaining, on the one hand, the properties 
of organic design exhibited by language—for which a poor (or empty) UG is envisioned as 
an explanatory ideal, and, on the other hand, how the human organism incorporates in its 
early experience a system with the designated properties—for which UG continues to be 
pinpointed as an unavoidable requirement (Chomsky 2007b). To say the least, the whole 
project sounds paradoxical. In contrast to this confounding landscape, the alternative that 
we have delineated throughout this paper is straightforward, since it conceives of explain-
ing the properties of the outcomes of development and explaining how they are attained 
as indistinguishable goals, which must be referred to the constraining powers of the inter-
actions between the ongoing constitution of the organism and its typical environment at 
different developmental stages—perhaps a threat to the “isolationist” image of Chomsky’s 
LOT thesis. Biologically speaking, the form that a particular organic structure exhibits is 
but the outcome of its developmental course up to the point at which it is observed. So, 
the most reasonable (or default) theoretical attitude seems to consist in thinking about 
development as the ultimate source of explanations about the way a designated structure 
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is. Language cannot be an exception if one takes the biolinguistic program seriously (see 
Robert 2004, for a suitable point of reference). Formal properties of languages—optimal, 
as hypothesized by the MP, or otherwise, a non-trivial matter of discovery—cannot be 
but the reflex of the way they grow in the mind of children—or if one prefers, the way 
children acquire them.
The views put forward in this paper may serve to offer a biologically informed frame 
to confront this challenge, without incurring in the shortcomings associated to the pre-
formationist stance. According to them, development inspires the partition of language 
into component parts, the growth of which are to a certain extent independent, yet exer-
cising crucial scaffolding influences on each other. This “near decomposability” (Simon 
1996) property is not alien to the MP, when framed within the programmatic proposals of 
Hauser et al. (2002)—see also Boeckx’s (2012) “I-mosaic” concept, and Balari & Lorenzo’s 
(2015b) “gradient of language” concept, as alternatives to the idea of a monolithic “fac-
ulty”. Our suggestions in this paper contribute to this overall framework with two non-
trivial addenda—in lines not uncongenial to current minimalism: firstly, general principles 
that apply to the constructive processes of these kinds of composite organic structures are 
likely to be the source of many design properties of the outcomes of language growth; 
and secondly, the minds of children could be freed from any kind of anticipatory knowl-
edge of the properties of concern—such “principles” of design need not be taken as the 
propositional content of some kind of a priori knowledge. Moreover, if the hybrid concept 
of language is on the right track, then the incorporation of environmental factors into 
explanations will be ready to transcend its timid association with interlinguistic variation 
customarily accepted by practitioners of the MP (Chomsky 2005). Environmental factors 
are not to be excluded from the developmental causes of cross-linguistically uniform prop-
erties of languages, as defended in this paper as regards the language-typical operative 
memory regime and the design properties entailed by it—the Basic Property, to start with. 
The corresponding properties could be safely freed from the unrealistic idea of a blueprint 
containing inborn linguistic knowledge.
5 Conclusions
“Weak” (or methodological) and “strong” (or ontologically loaded) versions of the E-/I- 
divide have been suggested in recent conceptualizations of the linguistic phenotype. The 
main take-home massage of this paper is that both versions can be now surpassed. As for 
the weak version (Lohndal & Narita 2009), we believe that time is ripe for transcending 
this “divide and conquer” strategy, for recent achievements of the theory of development 
pave the way for putting aside the kinds of cautions that motivate it and for aiming at 
modeling a more integrative view on the linguistic phenotype. As for the strong version 
(Chomsky 1986; 2016), we contend that it is just unmotivated and wrong. For even focus-
ing on the core, allegedly deepest layer of the faculty of language—i.e. the computational 
system, as customarily conceived of within the Chomskyan paradigm, what one reason-
ably envisions is a chain “environmental cues ↔ morphophonological transducers ↔ 
computational system,” which asks for a conceptualization as an integrated unit of bio-
linguistic analysis; thus a “hybrid” that relativizes (if not thoroughly defeats) internalism 
under any possible disguise.
The hybrid of language concept, to be sure, departs from the two main reference frames of 
linguistic theory of the last century. On the one hand, it departs in very obvious ways from 
de Saussure’s (1916) characterization of language as a social object (la langue) that properly 
belongs to speaking communities and only derivatively to speakers. The proper object of 
linguistics thus shares the same ontological status that Durkheim (1894) had previously sug-
gested to sociological phenomena at large: namely, abstract, external, and supra-individual 
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objects, which de Saussure referred to as “values.” Consequently, de Saussure rejected the 
idea that languages need being naturalistically approached and understood. The problem 
of de Saussure’s project is not so much how it divorced linguistics from biology as the dis-
embodied concept of language itself: abstract objects simply do not exist.
Chomsky’s (1986) biolinguistic approach was specifically aimed at refuting the idea of 
language as an abstract or Platonic object—defended, among other places, in Katz (1981) 
or Soames (1984). But the framework was historically motivated as a refutation of clas-
sical learning paradigms as able to capture the way speakers internalize their knowledge 
about such external objects (Chomsky 1959). In any event, Chomsky’s alternative did 
not exactly translate into the abandonment of the learning paradigm, for his conclusion 
is that languages are learnable in as much as most of the speaker’s knowledge is biologi-
cally fixed from the start, which actually serves as a learning device (Chomsky 1975). To 
be fair, such a device is just a black box of something that if really biological, cannot be 
but the output of developmental processes. Truly unifying biolinguistics with biology—
a goal still lying in a distant future, makes inescapable the goal of unboxing the device. 
The adoption of the hybrid concept of language defended in this paper has radical con-
sequences in this respect, for it makes dispensable the very idea of “learning:” once the 
boundary between the external and the internal blurs, the boundary between what learns 
and what is learned also blurs. Learning was probably a provisional metaphor—and a 
good one. But development is enough. While this may seem the end of biolinguistics as 
we know it, we rather think that it is the solid ground from which a bona fide biological 
approach to language must grow.
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